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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law—Federal Preemption of State Regulatory Au-
thority—Federal Government has Sole Authority under Atomic
Energy Act to Regulate Radioactive Wastes Discharged from Nu-
clear Power Plants—Northern Mites Power Co. v. illinnesota. 1—
In 1967, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) issued to the North-
ern States Power Company (Northern), a Minnesota corporation, a
construction permit to build a nuclear-fueled electric power plant in
Minnesota. The permit placed a ceiling on the amount of radioactive
effluents which the plant could discharge in the course of its operations.
Pursuant to a Minnesota statute, 2
 Northern applied to the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency for a waste disposal permit. The state per-
mit was issued subject to the requirement that the plant's level of
radioactive liquid and gaseous discharges comply with Minnesota stan-
dards more restrictive than those of the AEC. The state further re-
quired monitoring programs for the detection of such releases.
In response to the strict Minnesota requirements, Northern filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
against the state and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. The
power company sought a judgment declaring Minnesota to lack the
authority to regulate discharges of radioactive wastes because this
field of regulation had been preempted by the federal government
under the Atomic Energy Act .° Defendants denied that Minnesota
was without such authority and asserted that the state has the right
under the Tenth Amendment to protect the health of its citizens and
to regulate and prevent pollution within its borders. The federal dis-
trict court entered final judgment with a declaration favorable to
Northern.' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit HELD: affirmed; the United States has sole authority
under the Atomic Energy Act to regulate the construction and opera-
tion of nuclear power plants, and this authority necessarily includes
regulation of the levels of radioactive effluents discharged from the
plant.°
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the regulation of radioactive
effluents is intimately and inextricably connected with the planning,
construction and operation of nuclear power plants. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the fact that no provision of the Atomic Energy Act,
its amendments, or its legislative history had expressly preempted
state regulation° of radioactive wastes discharged from nuclear power
plants, the Northern court found that Congress had manifested an in-
tent to displace concurrent state regulation in this field. In making
that determination, the court was persuaded by (a) the pervasiveness
1 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
2 Minn, Stat. Ann. § 115.03 (1964).
42	 §§ 2011 et seq. (1970).
4 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
6 447 F.2d at 1154.
6
 447 F.2d at 1147.
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of the regulatory scheme as authorized and directed by the Act and
as applied by the AEC; (b) the nature of the subject matter, which
required exclusive federal regulation in order to effectuate uniform
standards and controls; 8 and (c) the fact that the Minnesota statute
hampered the accomplishment and execution of congressional pur-
poses and objectives as expressly stated within the Act,
Since the issue of the preemptive right of the federal government
to regulate radioactive wastes presents a matter of first impression
for the federal appellate courts, this note will first examine the doc-
trine of preemption and the various factors which establish congres-
sional intent to preempt a field of regulation. The Northern holding
that the federal government, under the doctrine of preemption, has
sole authority to regulate radioactive pollution from nuclear power
plants will then be discussed in light of the police power of the states
to protect and promote the health, safety and general welfare of their
citizens. The note will conclude with an analysis of the dissenting
opinion in Northern, and will suggest the need for an amendment to
the Atomic Energy Act.
Preemption is a judicially applied doctrine based on Article VI,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution—the Supremacy Clause—
which elevates federal law above that of the states." Under this doc-
trine, Congress, acting pursuant to a constitutionally delegated power,
may establish exclusive federal regulation of a particular area, thus
precluding the states from asserting concurrent jurisdiction. 11 Judicial
inquiry into the preemptive status of a federal law usually begins with
a determination of whether Congress enacted the legislation pursuant
to a constitutionally delegated power." Once such a determination
has been made, the court then considers the various principles of pre-
emption to determine whether Congress has expressly or impliedly
preempted the field of regulation in question." Under this examina-
tion, where Congress has introduced regulatory measures such that
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility,71"4 the state law is held to be automatically preempted.
r Id. at 1152-53.
8 Id. at 1153.
9 Id. at 11.54.
18 In passing on the issue of whether a state statute conflicts with or is preempted
by a federal statute, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ny such pre-
emption or conflict claim is of course grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution: if a state measure conflicts with a federal requirement, the state provision must
give way." Swift & Co., Inc. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 120 (1965).
11 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-66 (1940).
12 Id. For a thorough analysis of the constitutional bases for congressional exercise
of regulatory control over atomic energy, see generally Estep & Adelman, State Control
of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 41
(1962) [hereinafter Estep & Adelman]; and Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety
Standards in Peacetime Private Atomic Energy Activities, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954).
18 Id.
14 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
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Where such direct conflict is absent, the court must determine whether
Congress intended to displace coincident state regulation." This in-
tent is most easily discerned from an unequivocal and express con-
gressional declaration, in either the statute or its legislative history,
that federal authority is exclusive."
However, where Congress has neither expressly prohibited dual
regulation nor unequivocally declared the exclusivity of federal au-
thority, intent to preempt may be inferred from the statute or its
legislative history. 1 ' In addition, other factors may indicate that Con-
gress has impliedly preempted a field of regulation. For example,
such an implication may arise where the federal scheme is so perva-
sive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for state supplementation;" where the nature of the subject matter
to be regulated is one which demands uniform national standards;"
and where the state law serves to impede the realization of congres-
sional purposes and objectives. 20
 No one factor will necessarily suffice
to persuade a court to rule that Congress has preempted a field of
regulation by implication. Rather, a court must take into considera-
tion all the foregoing factors, and inferences arising therefrom, in
making its determination. 21
The Supreme Court's most recent attempt to formulate a com-
prehensive articulation of the preemption doctrine was set forth in
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul." In that case, a Cal-
ifornia statute had barred importation of Florida avocados not meet-
ing California's minimum oil content standard of maturity. However,
those same avocados were considered to be mature and in compliance
with federal marketing standards under the Agricultural , Adjustment
Act." Rejecting the Florida corporation's contention that the state
law had been preempted by the federal enactment, the Supreme Court
determined that the Supremacy Clause did not prohibit California
from excluding Floridian avocados certified as mature under the Fed-
eral regulations. The test, the Court declared, is "whether both [fed-
eral and state] regulations can be enforced without impairing the
federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at
similar or different objectives." 24
 Finding that the two statutes were
not in conflict, the Court held that "federal regulation of a field of
15 447 F.2d at 1146.
le See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
17 See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
772 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926).
18 Sec Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Public Services Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919).
18 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957).
20 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940).
21 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-09 (1956).
22 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
23 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
24 373 U.S. at 142.
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commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power
in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Con-
gress has unmistakably so ordained.'
In light of the Florida Lime decision, and because no provision of
the Atomic Energy Act had expressly preempted state authority to
regulate radiation emissions from nuclear power plants, the Northern
court found it necessary to examine the statute, its legislative history
and administrative interpretation in order to determine whether Con-
gress had manifested an implied intent to displace concurrent state
regulation. The court analyzed the historical development of the Act
and observed that atomic energy first became the subject of federal
legislation with enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 26 which
created a federal monopoly for the production and use of fissionable
materials. The Act expressed the congressional policy that
subject at all times to the paramount objective of making
the maximum contribution to the common defense and se-
curity ... the development, use and control of atomic energy
shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve the
general welfare, increase the standard of living and strengthen
free competition in private enterprise.27
The Act provided for the establishment of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and delegated to that Commission a dual function: to develop
a nuclear program to encourage scientific and industrial progress and
to safeguard the public health and safety." Ownership of all nuclear
production plants and all fissionable material was vested in the AEC
as agent for the United States."
The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes pro-
gressed so rapidly that Congress in 1954 amended the Act to remove
atomic energy development from exclusive government control and to
encourage the growth of atomic energy in private industry." The
25 Id .
29 Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755-75 (1946), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
27 Atomic Energy Act § 1(a), ch. 724, § 1(a), 60 Stat. 755 (1946), as amended 42
U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
28 Atomic Energy Act § 1(b), ch. 724, § 1(b), 60 Stat. 756 (1946), as amended 42
U.S.C. § 2013 (1970).
29 Atomic Energy Act § 4(c) (1), ch. 724, § 4(c) (1), 60 Stat. 760 (1946), as amended
42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1970).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2011-20, 2022-96 (1970). See Heiman, Pre-Emption: Approaching
Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Marg. L. Rev. 43, 53
(1968). The effect of the 1954 Amendment is described by Hehnan as having changed
the role of the Commission "from exclusive developer to promoter and co-participant-
sponsor of private development of peaceful uses of atomic energy; and shifted the pos-
ture of the Commission in matters relating to health and safety from contract adminis-
trator to regulator." Id. at 54. The states however, "have looked at the transfer of
development responsibility from government, to government and industry jointly, as a
surrender of a federal interest; and the establishment of extensive licensing procedures
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954 encouraged the licensed private ownership
and operation of utilization facilities,' the licensed private ownership
of by-product" and source material," and the licensed leasing of special
nuclear material. 84
In 1959, Congress further amended the Act "to clarify the re-
spective responsibilities . . . of the states and the Commission,"" and
to provide for the discontinuance of federal regulatory authority with
respect to certain materials and the assumption of such regulatory
authority by the states.
In effect, Congress indicated that each government was to have
only those powers which were defined in the Act." Section 274(b)
authorized the AEC to enter into "turn-over" agreements with the
states with respect to by-product materials in quantities not capable
of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction. Such agreements were to pro-
vide for the discontinuance of federal regulatory authority over those
materials and the turn-over of exclusive regulatory authority to the
states." According to section 274(b), states which entered into the
agreements were entitled to "regulate the materials covered by the
agreement for the protection of the public health and safety from
radiation hazards." 88 However, states which entered into turn-over
agreements had to provide licensing and regulatory programs "com-
patible" with the AEC's licensing and regulatory program.89 The cri-
terion used by the AEC to measure "compatibility" was, simply,
uniformity with respect to the maximum permissible doses and levels
of radiation and concentrations of radioactivity as established by
AEC regulations."
In light of the AEC's compatibility criterion, it is arguable that
states which entered into turn-over agreements were thereby authorized
to regulate radioactive waste releases from atomic energy plants, pro-
vided that the states' standards did not fall below those of the federal
government. Notwithstanding the feasibility of this proposition, how-
ever, Minnesota was precluded from making such an argument because
the state had not entered into a turn-over agreement with the AEC."
Moreover, as Minnesota acknowledged, radioactive effluents do not fall
into any of those classifications of materials enumerated in section
as the initiation of a new federal interest which needed to he weighed as a separate
concern against the states' interest in regulating public health and safety." Id.
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133-34 (1970).
82
 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970).
88 42 U.S.C. § 2092-93 (1970).
84 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1970).
as 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1) (1970).
88 Estep & Adelman, supra note 12, at 58-59.
S7 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1970).
88 42 U.S.C. § 2021(h) (1970).
89 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (2)	 (1970).
40 Green, Radiation Standards: Federal/State Relations, 12 Atomic Energy L.J. 402
(1970).
41 447 F.2d at 1148-49.
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274(b) with respect to which federal authority may be shared with
the states." Therefore, the argument that states which participate in
turn-over agreements are thereby authorized to regulate radioactive
wastes is not supported by section 274(b) and is tenuous at best.
The Northern court viewed section 274(c) (1) as further evidence
of a congressional intent to preempt state regulation. Section 274(c)
(1) provides:
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b)
of this section shall provide for discontinuance of any au-
thority and the commission shall retain authority and re-
sponsibility with respect to the regulation of—
(1) the construction and operation of any production
or utilization facility."
In Northern, this section was used by both parties to support two
substantially different arguments. The plaintiff contended that sec-
tion 274(c) (1) delegated to the Commission complete and exclusive
control over "the construction and operation of any production or
utilization facility," which necessarily included the discharge of ra-
dioactive effluents from the facility or plant." Essentially, the plaintiff
argued that it is impossible to regulate a plant's discharge of radioac-
tive effluents without also affecting the "construction and operation"
of that facility—i.e., more stringent emission standards would require
plaintiff's development and use of more sophisticated equipment and
procedures. The defendant, Minnesota, argued on the other hand, that
while section 274(c) (1) prohibited states from entering into agree-
ments with the AEC for assumption of any of the Commission's ex-
clusive responsibility for regulating radiation hazards, states were not
42
 Id. at 1148.
43 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1970).
44 447 F.2d at 1149. Accepting plaintiff's argument, the Northern court concluded
that "ftDere can be no doubt but that AEC control over 'the construction and opera-
tion of any production or utilization facility' necessarily includes control over radioactive
effluents discharged from the plant incident to its operation." Id. at n.6. In making that
determination the court cited the AEC counsel's analysis of 2021(c) in the Hearings
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:
The activities covered under this provision (i) include but are not limited
to the possession and storage at the site of the licensed activity of nuclear fuel,
and of source special nuclear material and byproduct materials used or pro-
duced in the operation of the facility; and the transportation of nuclear fuels
to and from the reactor site and the discharge of effluent from the facility.
[T]he purpose of this provision is to retain under Commission regulatory
control the operation of the reactor. We did not feel that we could begin to
cut up that into pieces, so to speak. The discharge of effluents from the reactor
involves many questions relating to the design and construction and operating
procedures. We did not think it could be considered by itself and broken away
from overall responsibility for reactor operation.
447 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis added). The court also noted a stipulation by the parties
at the district court level that "EwJaste disposal requirements affect the design, manu-
facture, cost and sale of nuclear reactor plants and associated equipment." Id.
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thereby barred from implementing stricter safeguards fashioned to
supplement federal standards.
In striking down the defendant's argument the court reasoned
that, notwithstanding the Atomic Energy Act, if states possessed con-
current jurisdiction to regulate radiation hazards attributable to the
materials enumerated in section 274(b), there would have been no neces-
sity for Congress affirmatively to recognize state regulatory authority
vis-à-vis federal-state "turn-over" compacts. Furthermore, there would
have been no need to limit the states' authority to the provisions and
the duration of such an agreement. In addition, the court reasoned
that the language of section 274(c) (e.g., "discontinuance" and "re-
tention") 45 implied that Congress had not intended to provide con-
current state control over nuclear reactors since the language of that
section was in the form of an exclusive disjunction. The court thus
construed section 274 as providing that the authority to regulate radio-
active wastes was either to be retained by the AEC or acquired by
the state, but not both.
The Northern court then considered Section 274(k) of the Act,
which provides that "nothing in [Section 2741 shall be construed to
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."4g The
court reasoned that subsection (k) evidenced a congressional intent
that states should not possess authority to regulate radiation hazards
unless pursuant to a turn-over agreement as authorized by section
274 (b) ; and that subsection (k) clearly indicated that subsection (c)
did not limit the states' power to regulate the construction and opera-
tion of nuclear power plants "for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards." Further, the court determined that in the
absence of an exclusive federal regulatory authority over radiation
hazards, the inclusion of the phrase "for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards" would have been meaningless and unneces-
sary.47 In addition, the existence of turn-over agreements, which pro-
vide for cession to the states of regulatory authority over those
activities enumerated in section 274(b), and the specific prohibition
against the relinquishment of federal authority over other activities
listed in section 274(c), supported the conclusion that the federal gov-
ernment possessed exclusive authority over radiation hazards, save for
those instances where states have entered into turn-over agreements.
The finding in Northern that Congress intended to vest the fed-
eral government with complete regulatory control over all radiation
hazards, except where jurisdiction was expressly given to the states, is
also supported by the legislative history accompanying the 1959
Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.''' In its report accompanying
46 See text at note 43 supra.
90 42 US.C.	 2021(k) (1970).
47 447 17.2d at 1149-50.
48 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2872-83 (1959).
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proposed legislation which was later to become the 1959 Amendment,
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy indicated that the licensing
and regulation of nuclear reactors should remain under the exclusive
authority of the AEC." In addition, the committee report noted that
the states should be prohibited from exercising concurrent regulatory
jurisdiction over radiation hazards, even where the states had regula-
tory authority over by-product, source or special nuclear materials.°
Those materials were to be regulated and licensed either by the AEC
or by the state and local governments, but not by both."
In the section by section analysis of the bill, the Joint Committee's
report noted that subsection (c) prohibited the inclusion of certain
matters in the turn-over agreements entered into pursuant to subsec-
tion (b)." The construction and operation of nuclear power plants
were among those subjects excluded because the committee believed
that continued federal responsibility in these areas was desirable.' The
report further stated that subsection (k) was intended to make clear
that section 274 did not impair state regulatory authority over AEC
licensees concerning health, safety and economic purposes other than
radiation protection." The Northern court interpreted the committee
report as clearly indicating a congressional intent to preempt state
licensing and regulation of nuclear reactors, and concurrent state regu-
lation of radiation effluents, even where a pollution hazard resulted
from activities conducted pursuant to a turn-over agreement .°
The court's rationale was also supported by the Atomic Energy
Commission's interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act, and the scope
of the administrative regulatory authority. The Commission's inter-
pretation of the Act as embodied in AEC regulations unequivocally
recited that, for reasons of radiological safety and health, states lacked
authority to regulate nuclear power plants and the attendant discharge
45
 The Joint Committee noted that "fllicensing and regulation of more dangerous
activities—such as nuclear reactors—will remain the exclusive responsibility of the Com-
mission." Id. at 2879.
50 The committee report stated that the Amendment "is not intended to leave any
room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by States to control radiation
hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials. The intent is to
have the material regulated and licensed either by the Commission, or by the State and
local governments, but not by both." Id.
51 Id.
52 The report stated:
Subsection c. of the bill excludes certain areas from an agreement under
subsection b. between the Commission and the Governor of a State. These
are areas which, because of their special hazards, or for reasons of Federal
responsibility, are believed desirable for continued responsibility by the Com-
mission. They include the construction and operation of production or utiliza-
tion facilities, including reactors . . . .
Id. at 2880-81.
55 Id.
54 Id. at 2882.
55 447 F.2d at 1153-54.
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of radioactive effluents.'" In addition, the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme indicated an implied congressional intent to pre-
empt. One commentator has observed that:
The federal licensing scheme to control the development and
utilization of atomic energy, as established by Congress and
implemented by the AEC, is extraordinarily pervasive . . . .
Furthermore, the Commission's licensing system is but a part
of an intensive program to promote the public and private
development and utilization of atomic energy."'
Further evidence supporting the preemptive status of the federal
regulation of radioactive effluents was found by the Northern court in
the nature of the subject matter regulated, and the corresponding need
for uniform controls in that area. The court relied upon congressional
findings which had led to the drafting of the 1954 Amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act. Those findings indicated that the processing and
utilization of radioactive materials, including resultant effluents, must
be regulated by the United States government in the national interest
of (a) regulating commerce, (b) providing for the common defense
and security, and (c) protecting the health and safety of the public."
In contrast, Minnesota argued that the subject matter was in fact the
more narrow area of pollution control, which included the regulation
of radioactive effluents discharged from the plaintiff's plant. In this
regard the state contended that such pollution was a matter vitally
related to the public health and safety of its citizens and thus within
its police power to control."
The Northern court rejected Minnesota's argument, characteriz-
ing it as "microcosmic."" The court noted that the argument disre-
garded the fact that regulation of radioactive effluents has significant
effects beyond the area of pollution control; and that these wider
considerations necessitated the removal of this subject matter from
the ambit of the state's police power."' More specifically, the court
56
 AEC Reg,, 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1971).
57
 E. Stason, S. Estep & W. Pierce, Atoms and The Law 1059 (1959).
58
 447 F.2d at 1153. An analysis of the draft bill of the 1959 Amendment suggests
"that the competence of the states to deal with radiation protection was not the sole
criteria [sic] for deciding the scope of the responsibility that should be entrusted to
them, the more basic question being the extent to which federal control was required In
the radiation health and safety fields due to interstate, national and international
atomic energy problems." Esgain, State Authority and Responsibility In The Atomic
Energy Field, 1962 Duke L.J. 163, 179.
59
 In support of this argument, Minnesota cited Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In Huron, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code, as applied to ships which were operated in inter-
state commerce.
69 447 F.2d at 1153.
61 [R]egulation of the radioactive effluents . . . is inextricably intertwined with
the planning, construction and entire operation of the facility. . . . [Major
generating plants . . . are part of an interstate transmission system which
makes possible the purchase and sale of electric power between major systems
821
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reasoned that the regulation of discharged radioactive effluents re-
quired jurisdictional control over the design, operation and construc-
tion of nuclear power plants which had been expressly and exclusively
given to the AEC; 62 that Northern was an interstate supplier of elec-
tric power, participating in an interstate transmission system; and that
Congress had vested the AEC with authority to find the proper balance
between desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety
standards."
The court was of the opinion that exclusive authority to find such
a proper balance had been given to the AEC because the states were
not capable of objectively balancing the legitimate interests involved,
and would set health and safety standards so high as to impede the
necessary development and use of atomic energy for the production of
electric power. Such an impediment to the national interest would be
directly caused by state standards exceeding the ranges of present
technological feasibility, or caused indirectly by the prohibitive costs
necessary to construct and maintain nuclear power plants in con-
formity with local standards. For these reasons the Northern court
rejected Minnesota's argument that the states should be permitted to
impose higher standards on the discharge of radioactive effluents in
order to protect the health and safety of their citizens." Consequently,
the court held that Minnesota's standard created " 'an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' "5 Admittedly, Minnesota's standards, more strict than
those fixed by the AEC, could successfully reduce the amount or con-
centration of radioactive effluents, thereby benefitting the health and
welfare of Minnesota residents. However, the issue, the court noted,
was not whether such reduction, even if feasible, might benefit Minne-
sota's public health, safety and welfare; rather, the issue was whether
Congress had in fact preempted the field.
In a dissenting opinion" Judge Van Oosterhout reasoned that
Congress had not "unmistakably" expressed an intent to preempt the
field, and that the Act in fact did not preclude the imposition of stricter
state standards. The dissent argued that the majority's "national
interest" rationale was not persuasive when contrasted with the inter-
est of the states in protecting the health and safety of their citizens
across the nation. Congressional objectives . . . evince a legislative design to
foster and encourage the development, use and control so as to make the maxi-
mum contribution to the general welfare and to increase the standard of
living .. . . Congress vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the proper
balance between desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety
standards. Only through the application and enforcement of uniform standards
promulgated by a national agency will these dual objectives be assured.
Id. at 1153-54 (emphasis added).
62 42 U.S.C.	 2021(c) (1970).
03 42 U.S.C. 2013 (1970).
04 447 F.2d 1153-54.
03 .1d. at 1154.
66 Id. at 1154-58.
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from radioactive pollution. Further, the dissent did not share the
majority's fear that state standards might unduly interfere with the
operation of nuclear power plants. Rather, it argued that the adequacy
of state regulations should be judged in light of a standard of reason-
ableness which would sufficiently guard against abuse by the states.
The dissent seems to suggest that, in an area which may pro-
foundly affect the environment, the states should be permitted to regu-
late radioactive pollution because of dissimilar local environmental
problems. For example, highly populated, industrialized states with
acute pollution problems may require radioactive emission standards
more strict than those promulgated by the federal government, which
are equally applicable to less populated, more remote areas of our
nation. For this reason, it is argued, a federal standard which is demon-
strably inadequate in a particular state should not preclude the promul-
gation of a state standard if the latter will more adequately protect the
health and safety of the local citizenry. The dissent does not intimate
that minimum federal standards for the control of radioactive pollution
are dispensable. However, it does seem to suggest that where stricter
state standards are technologically feasible and desirable, they should
be employed.
The allowance of concurrent "reasonable" state regulation of
pollution, as suggested by the dissent, is not a bold or untried concept.
In recent federal enactments which have imposed controls on environ-
mental pollution, Congress has provided for such a "reasonableness
test" within the statutory framework of its regulatory scheme. In the
Air Quality Control Act of 1967,07 for example, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was authorized to develop
air quality criteria" for the various "air quality control regions' of
the country. The states were then required to establish air quality
standards and enforcement measures consistent with the federal cri-
teria. If HEW determined that the state standards were unreasonable
or inadequate to protect the public health and safety, or were incon-
sistent with the federal criteria, HEW was authorized to promulgate
standards for the offending state." The Act specifically provided that
the states were not precluded "from adopting standards and plans to
implement an air quality program which will achieve a higher level of
ambient air quality than approved by the Secretary." 71 The Act's pro-
vision for concurrent federal and state regulatory authority was based
upon a congressional finding that prevention and control of air pollu-
tion was substantially a state responsibility."
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-8571 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-8571
(1970).
ea The Air Quality Control Act of 1967, ch. 360, § 107(b), 81 Stat. 490.
66 The Air Quality Control Act of 1967, ch. 360, § I07(a)(2), 81 Stat. 490.
70 The Air Quality Control Act of 1967, ch. 360, § 105(c)(2), 81 Stat. 489.
71 The Air Quality Control Act of 1967, ch. 360, § 109, 81 Stat. 497.
72 The Air Quality Control Act of 1967, ch. 360, § 101, 81 Stat. 485, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1857(n)(3) (1970).
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However, the Air Quality Act of 1967 preempted state regulation
of "pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles . . . on the theory
that a multiplicity of state standards . . . would make it impossible
for the automakers to meet all of them."" The preemption provision
of the 1967 Act indicates that although pollution control was generally
within the ambit of state regulatory authority, local regulation of an
interstate pollution problem (new motor vehicles) was undesirable.
Analogously, since electrical power is transmitted interstate, and, since
it is undoubtedly more vital to the national interest than motor
vehicles, regulation of radioactive emissions from atomic power plants
should also be denied to the states. Admittedly, the Air Quality Control
Act of 1967, unlike the Atomic Energy Act, expressly preempts state
regulation. However, as the majority in Northern pointed out, the
legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act indicates an implied con-
gressional intent to preempt.
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 retained the preemption
provision of the 1967 Act, and expanded that provision "to include
aircraft and aircraft engines as well as fuels."'" Prior to enactment, the
Senate version of the 1970 Amendments waived application of the
preemption provision to a state "upon a showing that a more stringent
standard was necessary and essential for the state to achieve the
ambient air quality standards applicable to regions within its jurisdic-
tion."" However, the waiver provision was later rejected by the House-
Senate conferees who prepared the final draft of the 1970 Amend-
ments." It may be inferred that the interstate nature of the pollution
problem was once again a controlling consideration.
As noted in the discussion of the 1967 Act, Congress generally
regarded the prevention and control of air pollution as substantially a
state responsibility. However, this congressional position should not be
construed as a conclusive validation of Minnesota's argument, in
Northern, that the level of pollutants emitted by atomic energy plants
should be controlled by the states for the health and safety of their
citizens. As suggested by the Northern court, the states' interest in
pollution control is outweighed by the national interest in uniform reg-
ulations that foster and encourage the development and use of atomic
energy, promote the general welfare, and increase the standard of
living." This suggestion seems especially valid in light of the vital
78 Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from
Congress, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571, 576-77 (1971). California was granted an
exemption from the Act's preemption provision because it had "adopted standards .. .
for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles" (42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(b) (1970)
prior to enactment of the 1967 Act.
74 42 U.S.C. § 1857-8571 (1970).
75 12 B.C. Ind. & Coto. L. Rev. at 600.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 447 F.2d at 1153.
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contribution made by atomic-energy-produced electrical power to
matters of national health, commerce and common defense.
In addition, Section 274(c) (1) of the Atomic Energy Act, which
provides for exclusive federal regulation of "the construction and
operation of any production or utilization facilityrs seems implicitly
to preclude state regulation of radioactive pollutants emanating from
atomic power plants. Since the level of radioactive discharges of an
atomic power plant is determined, at least to some degree, by its
physical layout and operation, state regulation of such discharges
would necessarily infringe upon the exclusive federal authority granted
to the AEC by Section 274(c) (1) of the Atomic Energy Act.
Unable to discern a direct conflict between federal and state reg-
ulation of radioactive pollution which would make compliance with
both impossible, and noting that the Atomic Energy Act did not ex-
pressly provide for federal preemption of the field, the dissent also
argued that since Congress could have expressly preempted the reg-
ulation of radioactive effluents, its failure to do so had not been an
"oversight."" Therefore, the dissent argued, since the failure to ex-
pressly preempt was not an oversight, Congress had intended to permit
states to take additional precautionary steps necessary to control air,
water and land pollution whether caused by radiation or otherwise.
In making this determination, however, the dissent relied solely
upon the absence of an express provision in the Act preempting state
authority to regulate radiation hazards, and did not consider the rele-
vant legislative history, which dictated a contrary results' On its face,
section 274(c) (1) may be construed as delegating to the AEC com-
plete and exclusive control over "the construction and operation of any
production or utilization facility," including the discharge of radio-
active effluents from the facility. This interpretation is based on the
fact that it is impossible to regulate a plant's radioactive discharges
without also affecting the "construction and operation" of the facility.
On the other hand, section 274(c) (1) may also be interpreted as
granting the AEC only the authority to promulgate minimum require-
ments and that they are not barred from establishing stricter standards
fashioned to meet peculiar local environmental situations.
Although it is a general rule of construction that statutory lan-
guage takes precedence over legislative history, this rule only applies
where the language is clear and unambiguous. 82 However, where, as
in the Atomic Energy Act, the express provision of the statute permits
more than one interpretation, the legislative history should be exam-
ined to remove the ambiguity." By merely relying on the language of
the statute, the dissent did not fully assess the intent of Congress.
70 42 U.S.C. § 202I(c) (I) (1970).
8° 447 F.2d at 1155.
81 See textual discussion at pp. 819-20 supra.
82 See Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
83 See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1945).
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It is submitted that the dissent misconstrued the scope of the fed-
eral regulatory scheme under the Atomic Energy Act. However, it is
suggested that the minority opinion does indicate the need for Congress
to clarify its intent by an amendment to the Act which would expressly
declare that radioactive discharge standards are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the AEC. Such a clear statement would preclude the
possibility of future judicial misinterpretation of the Atomic Energy
Act and would avoid decisions tending to impede federal authority in
a matter of considerable national interest.*
ALLEN N. ELGART
* The principal case was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on April 3,
1972. — U.S. —, 40 U.S.L.W. 3479 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1972).
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